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Introduction
Upon application for a residential mortgage the potential borrower is typically offered
the opportunity to lock in a current interest rate for the proposed loan. While this lock
opportunity may be deferred, all applications must lock before closing as the paper work
has to be prepared for a known loan contract. Loan lock periods vary, with forty-ﬁve and
sixty days being the most common, though shorter locks may be used if the application
process is nearly complete (i.e., the applicant allowed the interest rate to ﬂoat during the
application processing period). After locking, the application becomes part of the
“mortgage pipeline”. The mortgage originator then pursues a hedging strategy (which
may be no hedging) to protect itself from the adverse effects of interest-rate changes
between the date of the loan lock, and the date at which the closed loan will be sold into
the secondary markets. 
There are several reasons for a locked application to not close including: (i) the
applicant may not qualify for the mortgage; (ii) the requisite underwriting package is not
completed; (iii) defects in title or property; or (iv) interest rates decline and it is no longer
in the applicants best interest to close. If the probability of a locked application becoming
a closed one can be related to applicant characteristics, loan type and interest-rate
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Abstract. After allowing applicants to “lock” the interest rate, mortgage originators are
concerned with protecting themselves from adverse outcomes due to interest-rate changes.
One may expect applicants would strive to close applications when rates rose, while letting
themselves fall out when rates decline. Our results show that applicant response to interest-
rate changes and volatility are modest. The most important predictor of closing probability
is the length of the lock period, with shorter locks being more likely to close. Applications
for single-family are more likely to close than are those for multiunit dwellings.
Applications for owner-occupied properties are more likely to close than are those for
investment properties. Applicant characteristics such as loan affordability, education and
age have a small inﬂuence on closing rate. Gender has an effect for some loan programs,
and marital status appears to be irrelevant. Discount points affect reﬁnance mortgages
more than purchase mortgages. Conventional applications are more likely to close than
FHA and VA, and applications for reﬁnance, in general, are less likely to close. Results are
mixed for ARM and ﬁfteen-year applications, as well as for whether it was the original
application, or a relock.movements, a mortgage originator can better manage the pipeline interest-rate risk it
faces.
The importance of hedging the mortgage pipeline has been noted (McMurray, 1993;
Scrowcroft, Davidson and Bhattacharya, 1988; Goodman and Jonson, 1987) but these
studies do not attempt to measure the probability of a locked application closing.
Rosenblatt and Vanderhoff (1992) pioneered closing probability research by directly
assessing the probability of a locked application closing. A subset of their data is
presented in a hazards context in Hakim, Rashidian and Rosenblatt (1995). This study
extends the work of Rosenblatt and Vanderhoff (1992) by analyzing a more complete
data set. The data set is more recent (1990–95 versus 1988–89), larger (about 55,000 locks
versus 25,000), and it includes FHA and VA applications in addition to conventional
applications. It contains information not present in Rosenblatt and Vanderhoff (1992)
including interest-rate commitment on each application, measures of applicant
characteristics, amortization period, reason for reﬁnance (to tap equity or to capture a
lower interest rate), and interest-rate volatility (an important options pricing variable).
The data set is unique in that the information is recorded by the application lock being
considered. McMurray (1994) notes that one must hedge applications by lock, not by
whether the applicant ultimately closes a loan, indicating the need for a study based on
application locks. The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze determinants of
mortgage closing probability, which is an important ﬁrst step in determining how best 
to hedge the mortgage pipeline. We present an overview of the data, details about the
empirical model variables, an econometric analysis, and summary of our ﬁndings.
The Data 
Our data is for applications made to a nationally oriented mortgage originator during the
January 1990 to January 1995 period, which includes periods of both rising and falling
interest rates. The data set includes FHA, VA and conventional applications for ﬁxed-
and variable-rate mortgages with ﬁfteen- and thirty-year amortization periods. From
about 44,000 loan applications, there are in excess of 55,000 interest-rate locks. 
Most applications locked once, but about 9,000 experienced multiple locks. The
original number of lock days varied from 1–600 days, with an average of 46 days. About
43% of the locks were for 45 days, and 38% for 60 days. Less than 0.2% are for locks
greater than 90 days. For applications that experienced one relock, the average relock
period was 20.4 days. For those that relocked a second, third, fourth, or ﬁfth time, the
average lock period was for 23, 25, 43, and 48 days, respectively. 
Because of the cost of processing applicants, funding during the original lock is the
goal of mortgage originators. Two thirds (more precisely 66.54%) funded during the
original lock period. About 11% of the applicants terminated their application in this
period,1 and the remaining 22% went on to the next phase, either by allowing the interest
rate to ﬂoat for some period (i.e., allowed lock to expire), or by securing a new lock, prior
to the expiration of the initial lock (9.5% of applicants). Cross-tabbing of this data set
shows that as the number of locks increases, a somewhat greater proportion funds, but
through relock 3, there is not much change in the terminal outcome of a lock. An
econometric analysis is needed, however, to understand the relationship among loan
program, applicant characteristics and relock behavior that may affect loan closing
probability.
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The variables hypothesized to inﬂuence the closing outcome are provided in the follow-




CLOSE N/A The dependent variable. An indicator variable that takes the value
1 if the application closed, and 0 otherwise.
DISCPOINT 2 Discount points. Amount of discount points an applicant pays.
Higher discount points may erode the applicant’s ability to close
the loan, and an applicant may have a distaste for paying points,
even though they may be fairly priced, given the note rate.
DELPRICE 2 Change in price of the ten-year Treasury note futures (as reported
by the Chicago Board of Trade) between application lock and
termination. While either points or note rates may change in
response to interest-rate movements, the net effect of these
changes is captured by using the price of a Treasury future. 
VOLATILITY 2 The implied volatility of the reference instrument computed by
using the price of the reference instrument and the price of CBOT
options on the reference instrument. The higher the volatility of
an option, the more likely its exercise; similarly, higher volatility
increases the likelihood that interest rates will decline to where
fall-out will be desirable. If interest rates move little, we expect
loan closure as the applicant wants a loan.
LOCKDAYS 2 The number of days the interest-rate lock is in effect. Because
short locks only make sense if the application process is nearing
the end and the applicant has chosen to proceed with the lock,
short lock periods should indicate a higher closing probability. 
QRATIO 2 Qualifying ratio. The monthly family income divided by the
monthly mortgage payment, assuming the loan is amortized over
thirty years. It measures affordability by capturing the
relationship among income, loan amount and interest rate. As
this ratio rises, affordability falls leading to lower projected
closings.
SCHOOL  1 The maximum years of schooling of the applicant or coapplicant.
We hypothesize more educated applicants to have higher closing
rates as they can better navigate the loan closing process. 
AGE 1 Applicant age. We expect that older applicants will be more likely
to successfully bring a loan to closure due to having had more
experience in completing major ﬁnancial transactions.
MULTIUNIT 2 Indicator of a mortgage for a two–four-unit building. It may be
harder to qualify for multi-unit mortgages and the investor may
be more willing to fall out if the deal does not seem ﬁnancially
advantageous.
RENTAL 2 Indicator of a rental unit. Applicant is expected to be less likely to
close as less personal disruption occurs from not closing and
applicants are expected to be more ﬁnancially motivated to fall
out if interest rates fall.
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Hypothesized
Variables Sign Description
WOMAN ? Indicator that the applicant is a woman (which does not prevent a
man from being coapplicant). 
SINGLE  2 Indicator that the applicant is single. Singles probably have a
lower opportunity cost in not having a loan close as it may
disrupt only one person. 
SHORTLOCK 1 Indicator of a short lock period (fourteen or fewer days). This
variable, combined with lockdays allows for nonlinearity in the
effect of lock days.
SHORTRELOCK 1 Indicator of a short relock period (fourteen or fewer days).
RELOCK1  ? Indictor variable for ﬁrst relock. There is no a priori reason to
assume there is a difference in closing behavior among locks.
RELOCK2  ? Indictor variable for second relock.
RELOCK3  ? Indictor variable third or greater relock.
15-YEAR  1 Indicator variable for a ﬁfteen-year amortization period. Those
who apply for a ﬁfteen-year loan are probably more likely to
qualify for a loan and thus will be more likely to close.
ARM  2 Indicator variable for an adjustable-rate mortgage. Those who
apply for an ARM may be doing so due to a weak ﬁnancial
position and thus are less likely to close.
NORTHEAST ? Indicator for properties located in the Northeast.
MIDWEST ? Indicator for properties located in the Midwest.
WEST ? Indicator for properties located in the West.
SOUTH ? Indicator variable for properties located in the South.
RATE  2 Indicator variable that the reason for a reﬁnance was to obtain a
better interest rate. Hypothesized sign is negative as if rates fall
further, or are volatile, these applicants may fall out as they
assess whether their decision should be delayed. Applicants who
reﬁnance to tap their home equity are probably more constrained
in their need to reﬁnance and thus more likely to close their
application.
Exhibit 1 presents descriptive statistics for these covariates.
Logistic Regression Modeling Results
Because differences may exist among mortgage programs and uses, the empirical models
are disaggregated by loan program and purchase versus reﬁnance. We chose logistic
regression as the tool of analysis due to the desirable properties of regression analysis and
the reasonable restriction to model closing probabilities in the [0,1] interval. 
Exhibits 2–4 present the regression results. For each model, the ﬁrst column presents
the parameter estimate, followed by the estimated p-value, which in turn is followed with
58 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 1/2, 1997a measure of the impact this variable exerts on the probability of closing. The base
probability, from which impact is measured, is the predicted closing probability when
each continuous covariate is set to its average value (as shown in Exhibit 1), and the
dummy variables are set to zero. This means it is the predicted closing probability of the
original lock for an application from the South for a thirty-year, ﬁxed-rate mortgage by a
married man for an owner-occupied single-family dwelling. The impact measure shows
the percent change (from the baseline probability) in the estimated closing probability as
each continuous covariate value is individually increased by one standard deviation. For
binary variables, the impact measure shows the effect of the variable taking the value 1.
Because some variables that may be statistically signiﬁcant may not be economically
signiﬁcant it is helpful to provide an impact measure for easy assessment of the economic
signiﬁcance of each covariate in a nonlinear regression model. Exhibits 2–4 also show, for
each model, the number of applications in the sample and the overall closing percentage
for that sample. Because an R-squared measure does not exist for logistic regression, this
study presents the square of the correlation between the predicted and actual outcomes,
corrsq, which is analogous to the R-squared of linear regression (Maddala, 1988).
The ﬁrst set of results in Exhibit 2 are for conventional mortgages for home purchase.
The largest positive impact on closing is the length of the lock period or relock period, as
demonstrated by the 11.9% impact displayed by the SHORTLOCK variable and 14.9%
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Exhibit 1
Descriptive Statistics for the Covariates
(No. of Observations: 55608)
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
RELOCK 0.29 0.65 0.00 9.00
DISCPOINT 0.57 1.29 24.25 9.50
DELPRICE 20.03 1.75 29.75 6.91
VOLATILITY 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.11
LOCKDAYS 45.49 17.02 0.00 600.00
QRATIO 0.16 0.07 0.00 3.42
SCHOOL 15.05 2.69 5.00 30.00
AGE 38.03 10.67 18.00 91.00
MULTIUNIT 0.02 0.14 0 1
RENTAL 0.03 0.18 0 1
WOMAN 0.19 0.39 0 1
SINGLE 0.32 0.46 0 1
SHORTLOCK 0.05 0.22 0 1
SHORTRELOCK 0.03 0.16 0 1
RELOCK1 0.16 0.37 0 1
RELOCK2 0.04 0.20 0 1
RELOCK3 0.01 0.12 0 1
15-YEAR 0.13 0.33 0 1
ARM 0.18 0.38 0 1
NORTHEAST 0.06 0.24 0 1
MIDWEST 0.15 0.35 0 1
WEST 0.28 0.45 0 1
SOUTH 0.51 .50 0 1
RATE 0.21 0.40 0 1impact for the SHORTRELOCK variable. Because the indicator variable indicates a lock
period of fourteen or fewer days, fourteen days was used as the number of LOCKDAYS,
along with the value 1 for SHORTLOCK and SHORTRELOCK, when computing their
impact. While LOCKDAYS by itself is a signiﬁcant variable in explaining closing, the
positive sign on the SHORTLOCK variable suggests that short locks are where the most
impact is observed. The highest negative impact is for MULTIUNIT at 212.4%. The ﬁrst
and second relocks are about 7%–8% less likely to close all other things held constant
while a third or higher relock has no statistically signiﬁcant effect. The impact measure
also shows that ARMs are 8.6% less likely to close and ﬁfteen-year applications are 4%
less likely to close. Women applicants are somewhat less likely to close, and closing
probability is increased with number of years of schooling. Closing is less likely as the
applicants QRATIO increases though this impact is relatively small. The impact of
changing interest rates is quite modest given the long-term ﬁnancial impact. As the price
of the reference instrument increases by one standard deviation (i.e., interest rates fall),
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Exhibit 2
Logistic Regression Estimates for Conventional Mortgages
Mortgages for Purchase Mortgages for Reﬁnance
Coeff. p-Value Impact (%) Coeff. p-Value Impact (%)
Intercept  0.826 ** 0.390 0.12
DISCPOINT 0.008 0.61 0.2 20.051 0.01 22.4
DELPRICE 20.087 ** 23.6 20.092 ** 25.9
VOLATILITY  3.129 0.09 0.6 12.714 ** 4.1
LOCKDAYS 20.007 ** 22.9 20.016 ** 210.4
QRATIO 21.352 ** 22.4 21.948 ** 25.3
SCHOOL  0.049 ** 2.9 0.024 * 2.3
AGE 20.001 0.68 20.2 0.001 0.56 0.5
MULTIUNIT 20.479 ** 212.4 20.383 0.01 214.4
RENTAL 20.276 * 26.8 20.610 ** 223.3
WOMAN 20.126 0.01 23.0 20.056 0.42 22.1
SINGLE 20.011 0.79 20.2 20.042 0.50 21.5
SHORTLOCK 0.392 * 11.9 0.084 0.51 19.4
SHORTRELOCK 0.597 ** 14.9 20.122 0.43 13.3
RELOCK1 20.294 ** 27.3 20.027 0.64 21.0
RELOCK2 20.336 * 28.4 0.128 0.19 4.5
RELOCK3 20.215 0.13 25.2 0.445 0.01 14.9
15-YEAR 20.166 * 24.0 0.032 0.51 1.2
ARM 20.341 ** 28.6 20.263 * 29.8
NORTHEAST 20.119 0.08 22.8 20.076 0.38 22.8
MIDWEST 0.399 ** 8.2 0.369 ** 12.6
WEST 20.380 ** 29.6 20.225 ** 28.4
RATE 0.030 0.59 1.1
N 20097 10089
%Close 74.43 65.39
Base Probability 76.9 63.82
Corrsq 3.28 4.58
* indicates p-value < 0.01; ** indicates p-value < 0.0001Exhibit 3
Logistic Regression Estimates for FHA Mortgages
Mortgages for Purchase Mortgages for Reﬁnance
Coeff. p-Value Impact (%) Coeff. p-Value Impact (%)
Intercept  0.471 0.03 0.758 0.14
DISCPOINT 20.014 0.29 20.6 20.140 ** 27.1
DELPRICE 20.057 ** 23.4 20.099 ** 26.8
VOLATILITY 4.742 0.01 1.4 4.671 0.35 1.6
LOCKDAYS  20.017 ** 210.0 20.016 * 210.7
QRATIO 21.109 ** 22.8 0.348 0.36 1.0
SCHOOL  0.068 ** 5.8 0.020 0.21 2.1
AGE 20.004 0.03 21.4 20.004 0.36 21.7
MULTIUNIT  20.568 ** 220.2 20.601 0.01 224.0
RENTAL 20.299 0.20 210.4 0.406 0.02 14.7
WOMAN 20.030 0.50 21.0 0.062 0.61 2.4
SINGLE 0.043 0.26 1.4 20.062 0.56 22.4
SHORTLOCK 0.475 * 26.8 20.234 0.34 9.98
SHORTRELOCK 0.159 0.32 19.9 20.281 0.38 8.31
RELOCK1 0.172 * 5.5 0.133 0.24 5.0
RELOCK2 0.447 ** 13.6 0.071 0.74 2.7
RELOCK3 0.458 0.01 13.9 20.012 0.97 20.5
15-YEAR 20.385 * 213.5 0.158 0.12 5.9
ARM 0.092 0.01 3.0 0.199 0.10 7.4
NORTHEAST 20.138 0.09 24.7 20.589 ** 223.5
MIDWEST 0.384 ** 11.8 20.262 0.28 210.3
WEST 20.327 ** 211.4 20.503 ** 220.0
RATE 0.181 0.17 6.8
N 16737 2710
%Close 65.01 62.92
Base Probability 66.78 61.68
Corrsq 3.90 5.21
* indicates p-value < 0.01; ** indicates p-value < 0.0001
the probability of closing declines by only 3.6%. Rosenblatt and Vanderhoff (1992) found
a similar result, although their measured impact was somewhat stronger. Discount
points, interest-rate volatility, borrower age, and marital status prove to be statistically
insigniﬁcant (for alpha50.05). Regional differences in the closing rates are noted with
MIDWEST applications 8.2% more likely to close, WEST applications 9.6% less likely,
and NORTHEAST applications showing no statistical difference from the baseline
SOUTH. The only statistically signiﬁcant covariate to have a sign opposing that
hypothesized is the ﬁfteen-year indicator.
The second set of results presented in Exhibit 2 is for conventional applications for
reﬁnance. Overall the closing rate is almost 10% lower than for purchase applications.
One reason may be that the applicants do not realize how costly reﬁnance is until after
applying for the loan, and perhaps ﬁnd the expected savings are lower than envisioned
causing greater sensitivity to the ﬁnancial variables. Also, reﬁnance applicants are
currently using the residence under an existing mortgage and thus will have a more elastic
CLOSING PROBABILITY, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE APPLICATIONS 61response to changes in the ﬁnancial environment. Reﬁnance applications are more
sensitive to the number of discount points, and changes in the interest rates than are
purchase applications though the impact remains minor. Because current tax law requires
reﬁnance points to be deducted over the life of the loan, rather than at loan origination,
it is sensible for reﬁnance applicants to be more sensitive to points. Interest-rate volatility
shows a modest positive impact which is opposite the hypothesized effect. Reﬁnance
applications are also more sensitive to lock days, which remains an important covariate
of closing. The indicator variables for a short lock are not signiﬁcant, showing that there
is no additional impact of short locks, beyond the effect captured with the LOCKDAYS
variable. Applicant characteristics tend to show the same signs, but with higher impacts
than those for purchase. Applicant characteristics such as age, gender and marital status
are not statistically important. The ﬁrst two relocks are no different than the original
lock, but a third relock is more likely to close. Fifteen-year applications show no
difference, but ARMs are less likely to close. The indicator variable unique to reﬁnance
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Exhibit 4
Logistic Regression Estimates for VA Mortgages
Mortgages for Purchase Mortgages for Reﬁnance
Coeff. p-Value Impact (%) Coeff. p-Value Impact (%)
Intercept  20.204 0.58 0.201 0.83
DISCPOINT 20.007 0.76 20.4 0.009 0.86 0.5
DELPRICE 20.133 ** 29.7 20.128 * 29.2
VOLATILITY  6.956 0.04 2.6 12.975 0.16 4.7
LOCKDAYS 20.015 ** 210.5 20.017 0.04 212.2
QRATIO  20.915 0.07 22.8 0.203 0.80 0.6
SCHOOL 0.071 ** 7.7 0.021 0.49 2.2
AGE 20.004 0.18 21.7 20.007 0.34 22.9
MULTIUNIT 20.136 0.66 25.6 20.579 0.43 224.1
RENTAL n/a n/a n/a 20.062 0.87 22.5
WOMAN 20.362 * 215.1 20.267 0.35 211.0
SINGLE 20.028 0.72 21.2 0.367 0.11 14.2
SHORTLOCK 1.080 ** 47.5 20.164 0.70 14.7
SHORTRELOCK 0.226 0.33 25.7 20.001 1.00 20.5
RELOCK1 0.545 ** 20.8 0.170 0.39 6.8
RELOCK2 0.382 0.01 14.9 0.258 0.41 10.1
RELOCK3 0.898 * 32.0 20.022 0.96 20.9
15-YEAR 0.257 0.23 10.2 0.412 0.01 15.8
ARM 0.066 0.39 2.7 0.511 0.06 19.3
NORTHEAST 0.186 0.12 7.5 20.143 0.64 25.8
MIDWEST 0.488 ** 18.8 20.599 0.10 224.9
WEST 20.062 0.39 22.6 20.447 * 218.6
RATE 0.345 0.08 13.4
N 5074 899
%Close 60.47 64.29
Base Probability 59.07% 59.54%
Corrsq 6.86 6.00
* indicates p-value < 0.01; ** indicates p-value < 0.0001applications, whether the reﬁnance is interest rate or equity motivated, is statistically
insigniﬁcant. The regional impacts are similar to those for purchase applications. 
Exhibit 3 presents the models for FHA applications. For purchase applications, most
of the signs and impacts are the same as for conventional. Some differences are that
WOMAN and RENTAL are not statistically signiﬁcant. The SHORTLOCK indicator
variable is signiﬁcant, but the SHORTRELOCK variable is not. Another difference is the
effect of relocks on closing rates, which is the opposite of that observed with conventional
applications. FHA applications are more likely to close on subsequent relocks, perhaps
indicating that delays in processing FHA applications may cause some applications to
not close during the initial lock. Fifteen-year applications reveal a higher negative
impact, and ARMs show the opposite sign, though with a small impact compared to
conventional applications. 
The FHA reﬁnance applications show results are also similar to that for conventional
reﬁnance. VOLATILITY retains a positive sign, but it is not statistically signiﬁcant. The
qualifying ratio is also not important, as may be expected on reﬁnance applications.
Results also indicate that ARMs are more likely to close, whereas for conventional
reﬁnance there was a measurable negative effect. The overall base closing probability for
FHA loans is about 10% lower than for conventional for purchase but only about 2%
lower for reﬁnance.
Exhibit 4 shows that for VA purchase applications, discount points do not matter, a
reasonable result given than the seller often pays the discount points. These loans show a
greater sensitivity to interest-rate changes than do conventional and FHA. LOCKDAYS
shows a strong effect, and as with FHA mortgages, the SHORTLOCK indicator variable
is signiﬁcant while the SHORTRELOCK indicator is not. Male applicants are more
likely to close and schooling has a somewhat stronger positive effect than with the other
loan programs. Even more so than for FHA, subsequent relocks have a statistically
higher closing probability than the original lock. Fifteen-year and ARM applications are
not statistically different than thirty-year FRMs. There appears to be less of a regional
impact for applications than for conventional or FHA applications. Many impact ﬁgures
are higher than those observed for other loan types. 
The model for VA reﬁnance shows few statistically signiﬁcant effects. One reason may
be that the sample size is too small to achieve precise measures of the impacts. Fifteen-
year applications also show a higher propensity to close whereas the result was not
signiﬁcant for FHA and conventional reﬁnances. An interesting result is that the base
closing probability for VA reﬁnances was about the same as for purchase. The overall
base closing probability of VA applications is lower than that for conventional and
FHA. 
Summary
This study has determined several ﬁndings of interest for those devising mortgage
pipeline hedging strategies. The overall closing rate for a given lock was about 2/3 with
about 80%–90% of applications ultimately closing. The average closing rate, over all
locks, ranged from 74% for conventional applications for purchase to 60% for VA appli-
cations for purchase. In general, FHA and VA applications are less likely to close than
conventional applications, and reﬁnance applications are less likely to close than those
for purchase. 
CLOSING PROBABILITY, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE APPLICATIONS 63The variable that most positively effects closing is a short lock period. This result seems
reasonable, given that short locks will only make sense when the applicant is nearly ready
to close. Some of the short locks may be for relocks where the application process was not
quite complete on the previous lock, which delayed closing into a subsequent lock.
Applications for multi-unit properties and for rental properties also showed a strong
effect, though in the negative direction. 
The next most inﬂuential covariate is for interest-rate changes. When interest rates rise,
the applicant is more likely to close and vice versa. The strength of this effect is moderate
(about a 3%–9% change in closing probability as the price of the reference instrument
increases by one standard deviation). If applicants ruthlessly pursued their close/fall-out
option, a much greater effect would be observed, and a much bigger risk would ensue for
the mortgage originator. The remaining covariates tend to have minor effects, or effects
that vary by loan program. 
Note
1The mortgage originator regularly contacts applicants and thus can rapidly determine when the
applicant withdraws his or her application.
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